Within federally registered agreements, those agreements negotiated with union involvement make up around two-thirds of agreements (left panel of Figure 3).
Haldane AG (2017), ‘Work, Wages and Monetary Policy’, Speech given at the National Science and Media Museum, Bradford, 20 June.
In 2007, the RBA's training programs and practices
This section of our paper examines a narrower class of general equilibrium effects: whether union presence has spillover effects on the wages of enterprise agreements negotiated without union involvement. To our knowledge, this is the first paper for Australia to estimate a union premium that both accounts for union involvement at the agreement level and unobserved firm heterogeneity. Moreover, none of the studies control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.
where the dependent variable is the AAWI for firm 15 per cent of staff in these age groups.
At some point we may find that an agreement covered a different group of workers to its predecessors. An EA gives you ready and uncapped access to ArcGIS software along with timely and expert assistance from Esri so that you can focus on building a successful and scalable enterprise GIS. Online recruitment is the most prominent medium used to attract new employees; all This definitional change does not appear to be driving our finding that the union wage growth premium has been little changed over time. The union premium for the unmatched sample (dark aqua line) has been higher under the to attract a diverse range of applicants including from groups under-represented
We can partially control for firm-level shocks using measures of firm profitability and sales from Dun & Bradstreet.
This transition probability rose sharply under Work Choices (2006–09), but declined after Work Choices was repealed and replaced by the
year. Following the repeal of Work Choices in 2009, union involvement returned to 100 per cent for all greenfields agreements as compulsory union involvement was reinstated for those agreements. annual skills and performance review; staff covered by the Enterprise Agreement
The union wage growth premium implied by the DD models is several times larger than the fixed effects estimates in
Focusing on union membership, as the Australian literature overwhelmingly does, instead of the relevant bargaining unit can therefore give a misleading impression about the contribution of unionisation to aggregate wages growth in Australia.
Our results are more closely in line with Freeman and Kleiner (1990) and DiNardo and Lee (2004) – both of which consider the short-run effects of new unionisation – than studies using employee-level data, in that our estimates only pertain to recent union entry into negotiations within the past twenty years.
The RBA continues to attract
However, our baseline results do not reveal how this union wage growth premium evolves over the duration of a union's involvement with a particular agreement family, and what this means for wage Any errors are our own. LaLonde RJ, G Marschke and K Troske (1996), ‘Using Longitudinal Data on Establishments to Analyze the Effects of Union Organizing Campaigns in the United States’, Cai L and AYC Liu (2008), ‘Union Wage Effects in Australia: Is There Variation along the Distribution?’, Farber HS (2001), ‘Notes on the Economics of Labor Unions’, Princeton University, Industrial Relations Section Working Paper No 452.
Another potential concern around robustness is that the matched sample of agreements (i.e. A major limitation of these studies for Australia is their reliance on an individual's union membership status rather than union involvement in how that individual's wages are set. Prior to Work Choices, our data suggest that all greenfields agreements were made with union involvement, consistent with legislation in place at the time (Figure 13). Most studies before the 1990s found evidence for a union wage premium, despite Australia at the time having a highly centralised system of wage setting in which a large number of workers were covered by the same awards regardless of their union membership.
Since any within-firm union membership premium is small (Wooden 2001), and since the relevant bargaining unit is the firm, the lack of employee data should not present any major issues for our estimates. the age of 35 (at 57 per cent of total exits), although this represents only
Department of Employment (2016), ‘Non-Quantifiable Wage Increases in Federal Enterprise Agreements’, Research paper. Staff are also provided TEQSA Enterprise Agreement 2018-2021. To examine the importance of this bias, we re-estimate our baseline model including lagged wages growth as an additional control. purchase of an online accessibility training package which was made available For a discussion on features in public sector bargaining, see Productivity Commission (2015, Ch 24).
The RBA's Business Resumption Site (BRS), which became fully operational in with anti-discrimination legislation. Freeman RB (1984), ‘Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions’, of prominent online job boards. Indeed, the difference-in-differences estimates in column (1) of Table 6 are unaffected by the recent definitional changes to union involvement.
The large majority of graduates resigning were male, while the The DD/IV estimates could be upwardly biased by a macro shock during the Work Choices period that reduced wage outcomes in greenfields relative to non-greenfields agreements (e.g.
We estimate a ‘union wage growth premium’ of around ⅓ percentage point per year among private sector agreements (and no evidence of a wage growth premium for public sector wage agreements). Other factors that could account for the correlation between union membership and wages include the low mobility between union and non-union jobs, and mismeasurement of union status (Freeman 1984; Card 1996; Hirsch 2004). In cases where union status changes more than once, the difference in wage growth outcomes between all observations with and all observations without union involvement in an agreement family contribute to the estimate.